Secret Service acting director discloses multiple alterations implemented following Trump assassination attempt.

On Thursday, Ronald Rowe, the Acting Director of the Secret Service, disclosed the "significant alterations" made by the agency in response to the assassination attempt on President-elect Trump in July, which occurred in Butler, Pennsylvania.

On July 13th, the Secret Service failed to secure the Butler Farm Show site and protect President-elect Trump, according to Rowe's testimony to the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination Attempt of Donald J. Trump on Thursday.

He acknowledged that the abject failure exposed critical gaps in Secret Service operations and did not meet the expectations of the American public, Congress, and protectees.

Rowe stated that after the assassination attempt, he focused on: "determining the cause of the failed attempt; holding those responsible accountable; and implementing measures to prevent a recurrence."

Rowe informed the task force that the preliminary work for the Butler Farm Show did not meet the agency's standard.

The Secret Service director's comments on preparation were made after it became clear that there were issues at the July rally before Trump spoke.

Authorities were exchanging photos of the suspect, 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks, who was pacing the roof, minutes before Trump took the stage. Rallygoers noticed the armed man on a nearby roof and pointed and shouted after noticing him prior to the shots being fired.

The estimated distance between the roof where Crooks were waiting and where Trump was speaking was 147 yards.

The resignation of Former Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheattle followed the security lapse that left confidence at a low following Trump's first assassination attempt.

The task force received a detailed list of areas that the agency is addressing to address the July 13 event and prevent future assassination attempts.

• Vice President Harris and President-elect Trump will receive the highest levels of Secret Service protection during the campaign, in line with the protection afforded to the President.
• Boosting the number of Special Agents guarding President-elect Trump.
• Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are increasingly being used for aerial observation at events.
• Using unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as a kinetic attack vector can be mitigated by expanding the use of counter UAS technologies.
• To enhance radio interoperability, it is necessary to place Secret Service personnel alongside state and local public safety officials at unified command centers, with proper supervision.
• The Secret Service and Department of Defense personnel will assist in the development of radio communications networks with redundancies at Secret Service-protected campaign sites.

• The Secret Service can temporarily commit its personnel and assets to other protective visits with the implementation of agreements with federal partners to support its protective operations.
• The Secret Service, along with other federal tactical units, will enhance its protective operations for the Vice President, former President Trump, and other individuals by expanding its tactical coverage.
• Expanding use of ballistic countermeasures at Secret Service-protected campaign sites.
• The use of technical countermeasures and technologies to improve the security of the former and now President-elect Trump and his residence has been expanded.
• Aligning technology programs with operational entities across the Secret Service to maximize the use of internal research and emerging technology development.

Rowe stated that the agency took disciplinary measures for agents involved in the events of July 13, but he cannot provide any further details on specific disciplinary actions being considered.

The acting director outlined his goal going forward.

"Rowe stated that his objective is to enhance our mission effectiveness and restore public trust. One of the crucial systemic changes was the directive to mandate a unified command in a single location for all protective sites, which was not done on July 13th in Butler. This co-location improves our communications and intelligence-sharing mechanisms with state, local, and federal partners, allowing us to better anticipate threats and respond to them more quickly."

He stated that he had instructed the Office of Protective Operations to establish a continuous evaluation and audit capability to perform regular assessments of our advance procedures and protocols and identify areas of weakness.

Rowe emphasized the importance of mental health and wellness programs for personnel, acknowledging that the job's stress and pressures can affect decision-making and overall performance.

"Although I cannot undo the damage that has been done, I am dedicated to taking all necessary measures to prevent the Secret Service from experiencing a similar failure in the future," he stated.