The House GOP releases a critical assessment of Biden's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Republican Rep. Mike McCaul, released a critical report on the military's 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, detailing instances of severe mismanagement.

The Republican-led report highlights President Joe Biden's past callous foreign policy positions, including his urgency to withdraw from the Vietnam War as a senator and his recent decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, which demonstrates a pattern of abandoning strategic partners.

The report contradicted Biden's claim that his hands were constrained by the Doha agreement with the Taliban, which set a deadline for U.S. withdrawal in the summer of 2021, and it exposed how state officials lacked a strategy for evacuating Americans and allies while there were still troops present to safeguard them.

The 600-page report, which includes tens of thousands of pages of documents and interviews with high-level officials, provides a comprehensive overview of the findings from the past two years.

Biden was not bound by deadlines in Trump's Doha agreement with Taliban

According to the report, top leaders advised Biden and Vice President Harris that the Taliban were already violating the conditions of the Doha agreement, which meant the U.S. was not obligated to leave.

The committee discovered that NATO allies strongly opposed the U.S. decision to withdraw, with the British Chief of Defense staff warning that doing so would be viewed as a strategic victory for the Taliban.

The new administration appointed Zalmay Khalilzad, a Trump appointee, as special representative to Afghanistan, signaling their endorsement of the agreement.

The Afghan government was excluded from the talks at the Taliban's request, as per Khalilzad's orders - a significant setback for President Ghani's administration.

Despite the determination of the president to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to zero, some 2,500 troops remained in the country after Trump left office. According to Col. Seth Krummrich, chief of staff for Special Operations Command, Biden was determined to achieve this goal, regardless of any opposition. Krummrich stated, "The president decided we’re going to leave, and he’s not listening to anybody."

In testimony, then-State Dept. spokesperson Ned Price stated that the Doha agreement was "irrelevant" to Biden's decision to withdraw.

The failure to hatch an escape plan was due to the State Department's inability to build up personnel as it became clear that Kabul would fall.

The embassy in Afghanistan was one of the largest in the world, but the State Department ignored numerous warning signs to reduce its presence as the Taliban took over the country.

As the embassy shut down, Americans and U.S. allies were left stranded when the military was ordered to withdraw before the closure.

In a meeting, Brian McKeon, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, dismissed military officials' concerns, asserting, "The State Department has a greater risk tolerance than you do."

Austin Miler, the longest-serving commander in Afghanistan, concurred with McKeon's remarks and stated that the State Department did not possess a higher risk tolerance but rather displayed a "lack of comprehension of the risk" in Afghanistan.

The officer explained that McKeon's statements were based on the State Department and the president's statements, and that others, including Wilson, followed suit, hoping it would work.

The embassy's presence grew as the security situation deteriorated, and the report places blame on former Afghanistan Ambassador Ross Wilson.

Wilson was on a two-week vacation during the last week of July and the first week of August 2021.

The evacuation of personnel from Kabul began on Aug. 15 as the Taliban advanced.

The embassy in Kabul sent the first public message urging Americans to evacuate on Aug. 7, but there weren't enough troops present to begin the NEO until Aug. 19.

Despite not having enough military planes to handle the evacuations, the Transportation Department allowed foreign planes to assist on Aug. 20.

According to the report, Wilson left the embassy before his staff and allegedly had COVID-19. He reportedly had a foreign service officer administer the test for him so he could escape the country.

Despite months of warning, the embassy's evacuation plan was "still in the works" when the Taliban took over, as Acting Under Secretary Carol Perez informed the committee.

Unvetted Afghans were allowed to board flights while Americans and allies were turned away.

While Wilson stated that he was "comfortable" with postponing the NEO until August 15, Gen. Frank McKenzie characterized it as the "fatal flaw that led to the events of August."

On Aug. 14, when the Taliban encircled Kabul, NSC meeting notes show that the U.S. government had not yet decided on eligibility for evacuation nor had they identified any third countries to serve as transit points for an evacuation.

In the months leading up to the takeover of Afghanistan, fewer special immigrant visas (SIVs) were processed for U.S. military allies like interpreters compared to the four months prior.

As the final U.S. military flight left Kabul, approximately 1,000 Americans remained on the ground, while over 90% of SIV-eligible Afghans also stayed behind.

The report revealed that local embassy staff were not given priority for evacuation, with many being turned away in tears on the day of the Taliban takeover. The U.S.' only advice for those who may have been eligible for evacuation was to not go to the airport until they received an email confirming departure options.

Due to the lack of guidelines from the NSC regarding eligibility and prioritization for evacuation, the State Department processed thousands of evacuees without proper documentation.

One State Department employee stated that the U.S. government was unaware if those being evacuated posed a threat.

At least 314 American citizens and 266 lawful permanent residents were assisted by volunteer groups following the departure of the final troops from Afghanistan.

Scenes at Abbey Gate: Terror threat warnings unheeded before bombing

As U.S. troops were forbidden from intervening, the Taliban whipped groups of desperate Afghans at the airport, burned young women, and executed civilians.

Consul General Jim DeHart described the scene as "apocalyptic."

Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence was monitoring various threat streams, including a potential VBIED or suicide vest IED as part of a complex attack, by August 23. By August 26, the threat had been narrowed down to Abbey Gate, which was deemed so serious that diplomatic security withdrew state employees from the gate.

In the end, Brig. Gen. Farrell Sullivan chose to maintain the gate's openness based on demands from the Brits.

On Aug. 26, two bombs detonated at the airport, killing 13 U.S. service members and over 150 Afghans. The same ISIS-K terror cell responsible for the Abbey Gate attack had established a base of operations six kilometers west of the airport in a neighborhood previously used as a staging area for an attack on the airport in December 2020. Despite this, the U.S. did not strike the cell before the bombing.

An airstrike meant to eliminate ISIS-K members mistakenly resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians two weeks later. The administration initially boasted about the strike's success, but later admitted to the error after a family of civilians was killed.

Since 2022, CENTCOM has conducted 313 operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, while the U.S. has not targeted ISIS-K in Afghanistan.

The long-term consequences

The Taliban may have obtained up to $62 million in U.S. funds, including the $7 billion in abandoned weapons and the initial $57 million given to the Afghan government.

In February 2024, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban's interior minister, declared that the organization's policymaking is not influenced by relations with other countries, particularly the U.S., and that these relationships are irrelevant.

The Defence Education Enhancement Programme of NATO discovered that the Taliban were utilizing U.S. military biometric technology and databases to track down U.S. Afghan allies.

In the first six months of Taliban rule, approximately 500 former government officials and members of the Afghan security forces were murdered or disappeared, according to a report.

Since the takeover, 118 girls have been sold as child brides and 116 families are waiting for a buyer. Women are now prohibited from speaking or displaying their faces in public.

In June 2024, the Department of Homeland Security identified over 400 individuals from Central Asia who had illegally crossed the U.S. southern border with the help of an ISIS-related smuggling network. Since then, over 150 of these individuals have been arrested. On June 11, 2024, the FBI arrested eight people with ties to ISIS-K who had crossed through the southern border.